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Constitutional Collateral Estoppel: A Bar
to Relitigation of Federal Habeas Decisions
'But it may happen, for hundreds of reasons, that the Judges are
in a different frame of mind about the case, even from a legal view-
point, and one's efforts to obtain a second acquittal must conse-
quently be adapted to the changed circumstances, and in general
must be every whit as energetic as those that secured the first one.'
'But this second acquittal isn't final either,' said K., turning away
his head in repudiation. 'Of course not,' said the painter. 'The
second acquittal is followed by the third arrest, the third acquittal
by the fourth arrest, and so on. That is implied in the very con-
ception of ostensible acquittal.' K. said nothing. 'Ostensible acquit-
tal doesn't seem to appeal to you,' said the painter.'
The Supreme Court decisions2 which established that the doctrine of
res judicata3 does not prevent federal habeas courts from re-examining
state court decisions have been the subject of exhaustive discussion, 4 but
I. F. A , THE TRAL (Knopf ed. 1956) 199-200.
2. See p. 1232 infra.
3. Res judicata means literally "thing (or matter) decided." The common law doctrine
of res judicata consists of two principles, (1) bar and merger, and (-) collateral estoppel.
The former describes the effect of a prior judgment whenever the "matter decided" was
a cause of action (or offense charged), barring a losing party from relitigating the same
action, and merging the claim of a victorious party into the judgment obtained. It also
bars the relitigating of any issue arising out of that particular cause of action which
might have been presented at the prior trial.
Collateral estoppel applies when the "matter decided" is a specific factual issue, rather
than the cause of action itself, and bars the relitigation of tat issue, whether or not
the cause of action in which it is raised is identical to the prior cause of action. F.
JAssas, Civii. PRocsnuaR, 549-584 (1965). On res judicata and collateral estoppel generally,
see Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. RLv. 217 (1954);
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HIv. L. REv. 1 (1942); Note, Developments in
the Lanw-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. Rnv. 818 (1952). The conditions under which col-
lateral estoppel is applicable are discussed more fully pp. 124144 infra.
The constitutional counterpart of res judicata is, of course, the prohibition against
double jeopardy, presently consisting of the traditional concept of double jeopardy
which is roughly analogous to bar and merger, see note 78 infra, and constitutional
collateral estoppel, which has the same effect as the common law principle, but is
apparently to be applied with less technicality, see pp. 1243-44 infra.
4. A sampling- Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 378 (1964); Badger, A Judicial Cul-de-Sac: Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 50 A.B.A.J., 639 (1964); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAv. L. Rrv. 441 (1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus
and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UrAH I Rv. 423 (1961); Friendly,
Is Innocence Irrelevant.? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments 38 U. Cm. L. RL,. 142
(1970); Gold and Emerling, Federal Habeas Corpus for the State Prisoner-. New Looh,
25 Omo ST. L.J. 60 (1964); lay, Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus In'olving State
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virtually no attention has been given the reciprocal question of whether
state courts may subsequently relitigate the issues decided by federal
habeas courts.5 This Note will argue that such relitigation is constitu-
tionally impermissible under the rule of collateral estoppel recently
incorporated8 within the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.7
The constitutional question of the permissibility of such relitigation
in state courts did not arise until the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Ashe v. Swenson.8 In that case, the Court held that the rule of col-
lateral estoppel was applicable to the states9 as part of the Fifth Amend-
ment guarantee against double jeopardy0 and that the state was
prohibited from relitigating an issue which had been determined in an
earlier state trial of the same defendant.1 The question examined in
this Note-whether collateral estoppel also prohibits retrial of an issue
Prisoners, 45 F.R.D 45 (1969); Lorensen, The New Scope of Federal Habeas for State
Prisoners, 65 W. VA. L. REV. 253 (1963); Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The
Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 31 (1965); Meador, The Impact of
Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REV. 286 (1966); Oaks,
Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 65 Micaz L. REV. 451 (1966); Pollack,
Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attach on the
Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 108
U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Trials, 70 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1956); Symposium, Habeas Corpus-Proposals for Reform, 9 UTAit L. REV. (1964);
Wright and Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners-Allocation of Fact-Find-
ing Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895 (1966).
5. The operation of res judicata as a bar to such litigation seems to have been
recognized at common law, John McConologue's Case, 107 Mass. 154 (1871), and in
writing for a unanimous Court in Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923) Mr. Justice
Brandeis stated, at 430: "A judgment in habeas corpus proceedings . . . may operate as
res judicata. But the judgment is res judicata only that he was at the time illegally In
custody, and of the issues of law and fact necessarily involved in that result." Retrial of
prisoners released on habeas does not seem to have been the usual practice in the past.
See note 75 infra.
6. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970). This decision is discussed in Note, Ashe
v. Swenson: Collateral Estoppel, Double Jeopardy, and Inconsistent Verdicts, 71 Co.UM L,
REV. 321 (1971).
7. Now applicable to the states, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
8. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
9. Although collateral estoppel has been applied to federal criminal trials in the past,
see p. 1242 infra, only a minority of states had recognized its applicability prior to
the Ashe decision, and then generally rendered the doctrine ineffective by placing highly
technical requirements on its use, see, e.g., pp. 1243-44 infra. The state cases are collected
in Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 203 (1966).
10. 397 U.S. 436, at 445. Until 1969, the Supreme Court had never held the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to be applicable to the states. See cases cited
in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-796 (1969). Nor had the Court indicated that
collateral estoppel was a part of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464, 471 (1958) (expressing "grave doubts" that collateral estoppel could be
regarded as a constitutional requirement).
11. The sole factual issue in dispute at defendant's first trial had been his identity as
one of a number of persons who robbed the participants in a poker game. His acquittal
in that trial for robbery of one of the card players was held to have conclusively de-
termined this issue and to have barred its relitigation when defendant was tried for the
robbery of a second person at the poker game. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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where the prior determination is made by a federal habeas court-has
not been settled by the Supreme Court.12
This Note will first discuss the scope of modem federal habeas
corpus and the doctrinal basis for the present state practice of reliti-
gating issues decided by federal habeas courts. Attention will then be
given to the federal and state interests which would be affected by the
application of collateral estoppel to state retrial following a habeas
proceedings.
I. Federal Habeas Proceedings and the Present Practice of Retrial
by State Courts
The expressed purpose of federal habeas corpus"3 is to insure an
effective means of relief for individuals held in custody in violation of
their constitutional rights,' 4 and modem habeas procedures are de-
signed to provide the fullest opportunity to both the state and the
habeas petitioner for the litigation of the constitutional issues presented
in the petition for habeas relief.15
12. This question was presented in Chambers v. Cox, Civil Action No. 5154 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 16, 1968) (memorandum opinion, releasing petitioner from custody if not retried
within thirty days), id., (May 12, 1969) (memorandum opinion, denying relief to petioner
after retrial), aff'd mem., (4th Cir. Oct. 8, 1969) (unreported), but the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 400 US. 870 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Chambers case is dis-
cussed pp. 1233-34 infra.
13. The writ of habeas corpus, also known as the "Great Writ" or simply as "Habeas
Corpus," is the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. Ex Parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 84, 95 (1807). It is a civil proceeding brought by one in custody against
those restraining him to test the legality of his confinement. SoOt, A HAN roOK Or FED-
ERAL HABEAS CoR'us, §§ 1-3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Soxot.]. Other forms of the writ
of habeas corpus are occasionally used today, e.g., United States v. Smith, 310 F.2d 121 (4th
Cir. 1962) (vrit of habeas corpus ad testificandum, to compel delivery of prisoner for
purposes of hearing his testimony); Carbo v. United States, 864 U.S. 611 (1961) (writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, to compel delivery of prisoner for purpose of prosecuting
him). On the varieties of the forms of the writ at common law, see 3 BLtcasrox., Co:.t-
mNTAR.ES, * 129-50. On the history of the writ generally, see IV. Cnuuci, A TnxTis
ON THE WR oF H~ABAs CoRPus (2d ed. 1893); Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Cor-
pus, 9 ST. JOHN'S L. Lv. 55 (1934); D. MEAvoR, HA EAs CoRPus & MACNA C~ArrA (1966);
VALiER, THE CONm TONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPmiENT OF HABEAS CORPUS As Tim WIr
-or LrBErTY (1960).
14. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963): "If the States withhold effective
remedy, the federal courts have the power and duty to provide it."
15. In federal habeas corpus hearings, limited discovery is available to both parties,
and neither side is restricted to evidence contained in the record of the prior proceedings
in presenting its case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2246 and Note, Developments in the Law-Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1179-1187 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments]. Both the petitioner and the state must be given an opportunity to present ad-
ditional testimonial and documentary evidence on the issues in dispute. See, e.g., United
States ex. rel Molloy v. Follette, 391 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 917(1968) (remanded for evidentiary hearing in which state is to have opportunity to show
probable cause for arrest). Moreover, petitioner may be represented by counsel, and may
at the court's discretion have counsel appointed to represent him. See, e.g., United States
ex. rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960); Cerniglia v. United States,
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The scope of modem federal habeas jurisdiction has been broadened
by two relatively recent trends. The first of these is the increased appli-
cability of provisions of the federal Constitution's Bill of Rights to
state criminal processes. This has expanded the class of claims for
which relief may be sought on habeas.16 As a result, the number of
petitions filed seeking habeas relief has increased sharply1 in recent
decades from an average of just over 500 per year during 1945-19551 to
over 12,000 in the single year of 1969.19 The second trend affecting
modem habeas practice has been the line of decisions concerning the
power of federal habeas courts to re-examine issues of law and fact
determined in state court proceedings.20
230 F. Supp. 932, 936 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Demaris v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D.
Ind. 1960).
The Supreme Court has not extended the right to appointed counsel to habeas
proceedings. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969). While the availability of appointed
counsel might increase frivolous claims, it might also screen them out; see PRESIDENT'S
COur IssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADAINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TiE CHALLENGE O t
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIErY 189-40 (1967); ABA PRoJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO POsT-CONVICrlON REMEDIEs, 64-66 (1968); Developitents,
supra, at 1197-1204; Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions frot State
Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REv. 486, 504 (1966).
16. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, any claim that a prisoner's detention is in violation of the
Constitution is cognizable by a federal district court on habeas corpus. Thus, a prisoner
may be released if his conviction rests on violations of the exclusionary rule with respect
to illegally seized evidence, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S, 643 (1961), the privilege against
self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 878 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), the right of confrontation,
Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400 (1965), the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 885 (1966), or other constitutional guarantees applicable to the states.
17. Perhaps critically in the view of a number of commentators, e.g., Friendly, supra
note 4, at 143-4.
18. WRIGHT, FEERAL COURTS 217 (2d ed., 1970).
19. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TIlE UNITED
STATES COURTS 141-144 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT 19xx]. There were 2,187
petitions challenging conviction or sentence from federal prisoners, 7,359 from state
prisoners; the balance were petitions challenging the conduct of prison officials. The
effect of the decisions cited in note 16 supra, is evidenced in the increase in petitions
from state prisoners, from 127 in 1941 (ANNUAL REPORT 1964, at 45), to the figure of 7,859
in 1969.
20. In Brown v. Allen, 344 US. 448 (1958), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine
of res judicata did not prevent federal habeas courts from re-examining issues decided
in prior state proceedings, and that federal habeas courts could conduct de novo evidenti-
ary hearings for such purposes. Then, in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 298 (1968), the
Court held that federal habeas courts were required to conduct such hearings "unless
the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts." id.
at 813. Also, despite a state court hearing, a federal habeas court was required to hold
a hearing in certain specific situations: where (1) the merits of the factual dispute were
not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination was not fairly
supported by the record as a whole; (8) the fact-finding procedure employed by the
state was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there was a substantial allega-
tion of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed
at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did
not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. Id. at 813. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(Supp. V, 1969) provides that the state findings shall be presumed correct unless certain(essentially identical) indicia appear. The statute has been treated as codifying Townsend.
See, e.g., Maxwell v. Turner, 411 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1969). The Townsend criteria
are discussed in Developments, supra note 15, at 1122-45.
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Although hearings are held on less than ten per cent of the petitions
filed,21 approximately half of the hearings held result in the release of
the petitioner. -22 Such relief is almost completely illusory,2 however,
since the successful petitioner will generally be retried in a state court,.2
absent unusual circumstances,2 5 and since the state is not presently pro-
hibited from relitigating upon retrial the issues decided in petitioner's
favor at the federal habeas hearing.20 Typically, the habeas court will or-
der the prisoner to be discharged from custody unless the state retries
him within thirty (or sixty) days.2 7 In the case of Chambers v. Cox,2 for
example,2 9 the petitioner was originally convicted of illegal possession
of narcotics. On habeas, he contended that the narcotics seized from him
had been improperly admitted into evidence since there was no prob-
able cause for the search. The federal habeas judge agreed, and ordered
his release if he were not retried within thirty days. The state retried the
21. The data for 1970 are not yet available. However, just under 500 hearings were
held on 6,300 state prisoner petitions in 1968, approximately 8%. ANNUAL Rr'orm 1963,
supra note 19, at 208 (table C4). Assuming a relatively constant ratio, the number of hear-
ings for 1969 would approximate 1,000 on the basis of 12,000 petitions (see p. 1232
supra) and the number would be expected to rise for 1970. Justification for the assumption
of a reasonably constant ratio is borrowed by analogy to the apparent constancy of the rate
of release. See note 22 infra.
22. In 1964, 125 applicants were released, out of 3,220 petitions, approximately 4%
or half of the 8% to whom hearings were afforded. S. REP. No. 1797, 89mi Co:ic., 2D
SEss. 14, 22 (1966) (Apps. II, Ill). A figure of 4% was also reported in Wright & Sofaer,
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility,
75 YArm L.J. 895, 899 n.16 (1966). See also Developments, supra note 15, at 1041 n. 9.
23. The paradigm illustration is the case of Hobbs v. Pepersack, 206 F. Supp. -01 (D.
Aid. 1962). After 48 unsuccessful petitions for habeas corpus, petitioner was released on
the 49th attempt, only to be retried, reconvicted, and given a longer sentence than that
originally imposed. Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A2d 238 (1963).
24. Federal habeas courts are empowered under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 2255 to direct new
trials, and it has been held that such retrial does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969); United States v. Tateo,
377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964). The habeas court may also stay the order of release for a
reasonable period to permit the state to retry the prisoner. SoroL, supra note 13, at 83-84.
The frequency of retrial is not known, but the assumption of most commentators is
that retrial is the common practice. See SOKOL, supra; Judge Friendly, in a recent article,
assumed that virtually all of the petitioners who were successful on habeas were subse-
quently retried, and that at least half were reconvicted. Friendly, supra note 4, at 148
n.25. Id., at 147: "successful attack usually entitled the prisoner only to a retrial."
25. E.g., where the petitioner has served most of the original sentence. Cf. United
States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968). A long delay betveen the original trial
and subsequent habeas relief may also make retrial unlikely. See Friendly, supra note 4.
at 147; and see p. 1253 infra.
26. This precise point does not appear to have been decided by the Supreme Court.
Although earlier decisions suggest a contrary rule, see note 5 supra, the prevailing doc-
trine is that such relitigation is permissible. See Chambers v. Cox, cert. denied, 400 US.
870 (1970) and Section II infra.
27. See SOKOL, supra note 13, at 84.
28. 400 U.S. 870 (1970), denying certiorari from the unreported decision cited at
note 185 infra.
29. The case discussed would appear to be typical, since the exclusionary rules are a
fertile source of habeas litigation, See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure &' Section 2255: A
Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1964).
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petitioner and repaired the deficiency in its probable cause showing by
introducing additional evidence not offered at either the first trial or
the habeas hearing.30 The additional evidence consisted of further
testimony by the police officers who had testified at the first trial. The
evidence largely contradicted their earlier testimony.31 Reconviction
followed.3 2
Had the operation of collateral estoppel been recognized with respect
to the federal habeas court's decision, the state would not have been
able to introduce the narcotics seized from the defendant since the
prosecutor would not have been allowed to controvert the habeas
court's determination that the evidence seized from the defendant was
inadmissible.
II. The Analogy of Habeas Corpus to Direct Appeal
A. The Ambiguity of Present Law
The settled rule that the state may retry an accused following reversal
of his conviction by an appellate court2 3 has been held to permit retrial
following habeas relief,3 4 and courts in the past have not recognized any
distinction between direct appeal and habeas corpus with respect to the
application of the traditional prohibition against double jeopardy.
This analogy of habeas corpus and direct appeal has in the past been an
accurate one since, as will be shown, both procedures have limitations
which justify permitting retrial of the offense. However, the recent
Supreme Court holding that collateral estoppel is also a part of the
double jeopardy prohibition necessitates a more sophisticated analysis
of the habeas and appellate functions to determine whether the analogy
drawn between the two for purposes of retrial extends to the relitigation
of specific issues.
The leading case in which the Supreme Court has drawn the analogy
between direct appeal and habeas corpus for purposes of retrial for the
entire offense is United States v. Tateo"5 in which petitioner had
30. The federal habeas court had offered to hold a hearing to augment the trial
record, but both parties stipulated that the record contained all the necessary facts. 400
U.S. 870 (1970).
31. See note 185 infra.
32. A subsequent petition for habeas relief was denied by the district court in an
unreported opinion, Chambers v. Cox, Civil Action No. 5154 (E.D. Va. May 12, 1969),
the Court of Appeals affirmed (4th Cir. Oct. 8, 1969) (unreported), and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, 400 U.S. 870 (1970). See note 185 infra.
33. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); see, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 719-20 (1969).
34. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
35. 377 U.S. 463 (1964). This decision is generally cited for the proposition that the
prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable to habeas proceedings, just
1234
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pleaded guilty to and had been convicted of certain federal charges 0
arising out of a bank robbery. On habeas, he successfully contended that
his guilty plea had been improperly induced and had not been volun-
tarily made. On retrial for the original charges, his plea of double
jeopardy was upheld by the trial court, but reversed by the Supreme
Court, which explained its holding in broad language that equated the
functions of direct appeal and habeas corpus:
That a defendant's conviction is overturned on collateral rather
than direct attack is irrelevant for these purposes [i.e., whether
double jeopardy prohibits retrial] ... it would be incongruous to
compel greater relief for one who proceeds collaterally than for one
whose rights are vindicated on direct review.37
The Supreme Court here held that retrial following habeas relief did
not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, but
it did not consider whether relitigation of specific issues decided by
the habeas court was permissible. Thus, although the state could retry
Tateo for bank robbery, the question of whether it could re-introduce
his confession (supported by additional evidence of voluntariness not
before the habeas court) was left open.
This decision was rendered before Ashe v. Swenson 8 placed collateral
estoppel within the Double Jeopardy Clause.30 However, the Court's
language in Tateo at least suggests that relitigation of the issues decided
on habeas is also permissible,4 0 since any bar to such relitigation might
result in "greater relief for one who proceeds collaterally." ''
as United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), limits its application in the appellate process.
See, e.g., Mulreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095, 1101 (6th Cir. 1970); Houp v. Nebraska, 427
F.2d 254, 255-6 (8th Cir. 1970); SOKOL, supra note 13, at 83. The Taleo decision in effect
merely approves the prior practice of lower courts. See, e.g., Robinson v. United States,
144 F.2d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 US. 282 (1945); Bryant v. United States, 214
F. 51, 53 (8th Cir. 1914), stating that it is "immaterial that his attack Lvas collateral, as
by habeas corpus, instead of direct, by appeal or writ of error."
36. Defendant was charged with taking and carr)ing away bank money, receiving and
possessing stolen bank money and conspiracy to commit these offenses. United States v.
Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 464 (1964).
37. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
38. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
39. The difference between double jeopardy, as traditionally conceptualized, and col-
lateral estoppel are discussed at Section II-c infra and at note 3 supra.
40. And see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US. 711, 720 (1969) stating that the doublejeopardy dause "imposes no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant
who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside." Clearly, prohibiting the reliti.
gation of issues decided on habeas can be viewed as limiting to some degree the state's
power to retry. Yet the above language cannot mean to give the state an absolute power
to relitigate all issues decided on habeas, e.g., whether a prisoner had waived his right to
appeal, or was the victim of racially discriminatory jury selection, or whether a prose-
cutor had made a promise to recommend probation. See Kearns v. Field, 432 F.2d 63 (9th
Cir. 1970).
41. "Greater relief" would have been the outcome in Chambers v. Cox, see pp. 1233-34
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On the other hand, the Tateo decision was premised on the congruity
of the habeas and appellate functions, and the Supreme Court has
frequently emphasized the differences in the procedures. 4 - There is,
therefore, some uncertainty as to whether the Tateo holding as to
double jeopardy should extend to collateral estoppel.
B. Double Jeopardy: Direct Appeal and Habeas Corpus
The fact that appellate review and habeas corpus serve different
functions and employ markedly different procedures suggests that al-
though the double jeopardy guarantee is correctly held not to prevent
retrial following either form of relief, the reasons for this limitation on
double jeopardy in the case of appellate review are substantially differ-
ent from the reasons which justify the same limitations in the habeas
context. The different rationales, when applied to collateral estoppel,
suggest in turn the appropriateness of different results-the prohibition
of relitigation of specific issues in the habeas setting but not in the
context of a direct appeal.
The principle that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial
of an accused following reversal of his conviction on appeal was estab-
lished in United States v. Ball.43
The Ball principle traditionally has been justified in terms of three
theories:44 that there is a single continuing jeopardy, within which the
supra, if collateral estoppel had been applied, since effective retrial would have been
prevented because the critical evidence against the defendant had been ruled Inadmissible
by the habeas court. Even where the issue was not one vital to the state's case, a defendant
might obtain "greater relief" from a prohibition which barred the relitigation of issues
decided in his favor on habeas, since the issue raised on habeas must have been more than
a "harmless error," see notes 159160 infra, and therefore of some probative value to the
state. Thus the chance of creating a reasonable doubt on retrial might be greater for a
defendant who succeeds on habeas than for one "whose rights are vindicated on direct
review." United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
42. "The whole history of the writ-its unique development-refutes a construction of
the federal courts' habeas powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of
appellate review. The function on habeas is different. It is ... an original civil proceed-
ing, independent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments." Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
43. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). In this case, defendants were convicted of murder and were
retried for that offense after the original conviction was set aside for a deficiency in the
indictment. The Supreme Court rejected a plea of double jeopardy with the bald
statement that:
It is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a judgment against him to be
set aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indict-
ment, for the same offense of which he had been convicted. Id. at 672.
44. The authorities discussing waiver and continuity are collected in State v, Schmear,
28 Wis. 2d 126, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 842, 847-48 (1964). See also United States v. Greci,
355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957).
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accused remains until there is a final adjudication free from error;45
that the convicted accused, in seeking to set aside his conviction on
appeal, waives his constitutional protection against double jeopardy;4
or that considerations regarding the fair and efficient administration of
justice permit retrial after a reversal for error.47 Neither of the first two
theories receive much credence today.48 In United States v. Tateo,40 the
Court emphasized that the Ball principle was the product not of
ineluctable logic but of a necessary accommodation of competing in-
terests: 50 society would be injured to the extent that persons apparently
guilty in fact but convicted at a procedurally defective trial were thus
able to avoid reprosecution and punishment; and all defendants,r'
innocent or guilty, would suffer to the extent that appellate (or habeas)
courts, concerned with this immunity, 2 would tend to overlook revers-
45. See Kepner v. United States, 195 US. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissnting); cf.
Palko v. Connecticut, .02 US. 319 (1937).
46. Compare Sapir v. United States, 348 US. 373, 374 (1955) (per curiam, Douglas, J.,
concurring) with Forman v. United States, 361 US. 416, 425-26 (19ti0) and Bryan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1950).
47. See pp. 1238-39 infra.
48. The continuity theory was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). See also Green v. United States, 355 US. 184, 191.93
(1957). But see Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutlions,
74 HAuv. L REv. 1, 6-7 (1960) wherein the authors view Holmes' defense of continuity
doctrine in Kepner as much more consistent with double jeopardy than the waiver vie"
implicit in the majority opinion. The continuity theory was held not to violate due process
in state criminal procedure in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319 (1937), but that decision
has been overruled by Benton v. Maxyland, 395 US. 784 (1969) which applied the Fifth
Amendment to the states, and with it the Kepner rule.
The waiver theory was sharply criticized by the Supreme Court in Green v. United
States, 355 US. 184, 191-7 (1957) (the Court characterizing the waiver theory as "wholly
fictional" and "totally unsound and indefensible'), but recently was revived by North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US. 711, 720-21 (1969).
49. 377 US. 463 (1964) (on appeal from a reconviction followdng habeas relief, the
Court held that the retrial did not violate double jeopardy; the Court's language referred
to both habeas and appellate relief). See note 50 infra.
50. "[O]f greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain
the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration ofjustice. Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal
interest in punishing one whose guilt is dear after he has obtained such a trial. It vould
be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from
punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error..... From the
standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate courts would be as
zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of mp rieties.... In reality,
therefore, the practice of retrial serves defendants rights well as society's interests." 377US. 463, 466 (1964).
51. Not only convicted deendants might suffer, but also an uncertain proportion ofthose accused but presently acquitted, and even of those presently not acclsed. To theextent that appellate courts might begin overlooong erroneous trial conduct, such cn-
duct might increase, and with it the probability of conviction. Further, the increaed
possibility of obtaining convictions in eases which would be questionable under presentstandards might lead to more prosecutions52. Cf. Gori v. United States, 367 US. 364, 369 (1961) (the Court describing the prob-
lems which confront the trial courts if double jeopardy invariably prcvents retrial fo-
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ible error. Thus, fairness to both society and the class of persons accused
of crimes requires an acceptably accurate 3 determination of the ac-
cused's guilt (or innocence) in fact prior to any dispositive decision on
his status (i.e., whether he should be set free or punished).
Because of the limited information before it in the form of the
record on appeal, an appellate court is ill-equipped, in those cases where
reversible error occurred at trial, to decide which of the final alterna-
tives of aquittal or conviction is the correct substitute for the decision
below.54 The deficiency in the evidence may be the result of the
appellate court's ruling that certain evidence was improperly ad-
mitted,rr or it may be due to the trial judge applying an improper
standard of law (or improperly applying a proper standard) which the
prosecution met.56 In either case, the prosecution may have had addi-
tional evidence which was not offered because of the trial court's rul-
ings. The appellate court has no means of evaluating the probative
value of such evidence.57 Thus, if retrial were not available, the appel-
late court would be forced to speculate on what the evidence might
have been, had there been no error. Further, it must speculate, in effect,
not only on whether the hypothetical evidence would be sufficient to
lowing a mistrial as "compelling them to navigate a narrow compass between Scylla and
Charybdis').
53. The term "acceptably accurate" is used in the same sense as Professor Jaffe put It,
"The question then is not whcther the fact exists in an absolute sense but whether
the evidence is adequate to justify the exercise of power: ultimately, whether the evidence
is a sufficient moral predicate in the sense that society will accept it as sufficient for the
exercise of the power in question." Jaffee, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 IAV.
L. REv. 239, 244 (1955).
54. Cf. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 367 (1961): "Certainly, on the skimpy record
before us it would exceed the appropriate scope of review were we ourselves to attempt
to pass an independent judgment upon the propriety of the mistrial . . ."; Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. Rav. 751 (1957).
55. See, e.g., West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. McCone, 330 U.S. 212, 214 (1947).
56. See, e.g., Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (lower court did not
find defendant's confession to be voluntary "beyond a reasonable doubt'); Fisher v.
United States, 382 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1967) (lower court did not make a "clear cut deternilna-
tion" of the voluntariness of defendant's confession). As these decisions suggest, there
exists considerable disagreement on the standard of proof required on various Issues In
the criminal process. There is, therefore, a real possibility that an erroneous standard
might be applied to an issue at some stage between arrest and conviction. See the collec-
tion, discussion, and analysis of decisions in United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp, '13
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) and cf. Rideout v. Superior Court, 67 Cal,2d 471, 432 P.2d 197 (1967).
(The California Supreme Court split 4-3 over the question of the amount of evidence
which must be shown at a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause for an arrest.
The majority test was whether a "man of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to
believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused," the
minority would require only "some evidence" upon which equally prudent men "might
believe the accused to be guilty.")
57. See, e.g., Sykes v. United States, 373 F.2d 607, 612-13 (1966) (indicating that counsel's
failure to object on some issues will almost inevitably produce an incomplete record since
the appellate court can never know what justification would have been offered by the
state if the point, e.g., a search, had been challenged).
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support a verdict but also on whether a jury would have reached the
same verdict, given the different evidence.
The fairness of permitting retrial following appellate reversal is
strikingly illustrated when the conviction overturned was based on
defendant's plea of guilty, a plea which is then held on appeal to have
been coerced. 58 Here, there may have been no trial at all on the merits
and therefore no evidence in the record before the appellate court on
the issue of guilt or innocence. Clearly, it would be undesirable to
force the appellate court to choose between the alternatives of acquittal
and conviction on the basis of such a record. Thus, permitting" the
appellate court to order a retrial following reversal does fairly accommo-
date the competing interests involved, by referring the dispositive
determination of a defendant's status to the process (trial) better
equipped to adduce all the evidence relevant to his guilt or innocence.
The Supreme Court also has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prevent retrial of an accused who successfully attacks his
conviction on habeas rather than by direct review.60 Justification for
this limitation on the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy
is not based on a "continuity" theory since the habeas function is not
a continuation of previous litigation,6' nor is the waiver theory applica-
ble to retrial following habeas relief. 2
The justification for permitting retrial after habeas relief is similar
to the justification for permitting retrial following appellate reversal:
58. Cf. United States v. Tateo, 377 US. 463 (1964).
59. Under 28 US.C. § 2106 the appellate court does not have to allow retrial, but may
do so in its discretion; see Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950) and decisions cited
therein.
60. See note 35 supra.
61. As has been noted, habeas corpus is a civil suit independent of the prior criminal
trial. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963). It may be based on a constitutional
violation which occurred before trial, such as improper jury selection, or after trial, in
the sentencing. Bryant v. United States, 214 F.2d 51 (1914).
62. As applied by the Supreme Court in several decisions, the permissibility of retrial
under the waiver theory turns on whether the accused requests a new trial. See Sapir
v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (per curiam, Douglas, J., concurring); Bryan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 552, 560 (1950); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425 (1960). The
petitioner on habeas cannot seek a new trial, since the only remedy arailable on habeas is
release from custody. SOKOL, supra note 13, § 15. Regardless of the form of the prayer,
however, the court is also empowered by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964), relating to federal
prisoners, to correct a sentencing error or order a new trial. As to slate prisoners, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243 (1964) empowers the court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require."
Although the Act of 1867 contained the same wording (see Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 29, 14
Stat. 385), it wtas apparently not construed to authorize remedies other than outright
release prior to the decision in In re Bonner, 151 US. 242 (1894), discussed in note 75
infra. Thus, treating the habeas petition as a waiver would be iconsistent with tradi-
tional waiver theory. In United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964), the district court had
held that seeking habeas relief did not constitute a waiver, and dismissed the second
prosecution. The Supreme Court, in reversing, avoided reliance on the waiver theory. See
p. 1237 supra.
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fairness in the administration of justice to both society and the accused.
However, the reasons why such fairness requires retrial following
habeas relief are not the same as those discussed earlier with regard to
the appellate process.63 By contrast to the appellate process the habeas
proceeding is a distinct and separate cause of action brought by the
petitioner against his custodian charging "unlawful imprisonment."04
The petition for habeas may allege any constitutional violation which
renders the custody unlawful, whether or not the issue is related to or
was raised at the trial.6 The habeas hearing is premised on the inade-
quate development of the factual issues, 0 and is held for the purpose of
receiving evidence to resolve those issues. Both sides may introduce
testimonial and documentary evidence on the issues raised by the
petition,67 and the petitioner has the burden of proving his allegations
by a preponderance of the evidence,08 although the burden of proof
may shift to the state once a prima facie case is made out by the peti-
tioner.,9 Thus, while the appellate function is based on a presumption
of the sufficiency of the trial record as a basis for the disposition of the
issues presented, the habeas function is based on the opposite presump-
tion, the insufficiency of previous factual determinations 0 which may
necessitate a trial de novo on the issues presented in the petition. The
habeas court does not, therefore, suffer from any informational defi-
ciency which renders it incompetent to adjudicate the issue before it,
The reason for permitting retrial is that the issue before the habeas
court is not the guilt or innocence of the petitioner,7' nor the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the general verdict 72 because such issues are
not cognizable on habeas.73 The habeas court deals only with narrow
63. See pp. 1238-39 supra.
64. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908). SoXoL, supra note 13, at 2-5.
65. See generally SosoL, id., § 9.
66. See p. 1232 supra.
67. See p. 1231 supra.
68. Johnson v. Zerbst, 804 U.S. 458, 468-9 (198); Kress v. United States, 411 F.2d 16, 20
(8th Cir. 1969); White v. McHan, 386 F.2d 817, 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
69. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); Losieau v. Si;ler, 406 F.2d 795,
802-03 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 988 (1969); Montana v. Tormch, 832 F.2d 987
(9th Cir. 1964).
70. See p. 1232 supra.
71. Such issues are not cognizable on habeas, nor is it the function of habeas to retry
the prisoner. Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-203 (1830); Holt v. United States,
303 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1962); and see note 73 infra. But see the strong argument by
Judge Friendly that habeas relief should be denied absent a "colorable claim of innocence."
Friendly, supra note 4.
72. Again, not cognizable on habeas. Casias v. Patterson, 398 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1968).
73. Habeas jurisdiction is predicated upon an alleged violation of a constitutional right.
Although the statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964), confers jurisdiction as to viola-
tions of the Constitution "or laws" of the United States, the courts have declined to grant
the writ for nonconstitutional federal questions. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312
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issues of fact concerning specific violations of constitutional rights.7'
The habeas court is competent to examine and make determinations
regarding the factual basis of such issues, but such issues are not neces-
sarily dispositive of, and may be wholly unrelated to, the question of
petitioner's guilt or innocence. With respect to that question, the
habeas court is in no better position to make a dispositive determina-
tion than is an appellate court.75
C. Collateral Estoppel: Direct Appeal and Habeas Corpus
As defined in Ashe v. Swenson,7 collateral estoppel "means simply
that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid
and final judgment, that issue cannot be litigated between the same
parties in any future lawsuit." 77 As noted, collateral estoppel differs
significantly from the traditional double jeopardy prohibition. The
latter operates only to bar a retrial of the "same" offense.71 Collateral
(1963); Stewart v. Cox, 344 F.2d 947 (10th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Peyton, 297 F. Supp. 857,
860 (WJD. Va. 1969) ("Federal habeas corpus is available only when there has been a denial
of a constitutional right').
74. Such as the existence of probable cause to warrant a search, Chambers v. Cox, cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 870 (1970); racially discriminatory jury selection, White v. McHan, 886
F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1967); the voluntariness of a guilty plea or confession, United States v.
Tateo, 377 US. 463 (1964); or improper sentencing, In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
75. Thus, a dilemma similar to that outlined in Tateo, supra note 50, was possble for
habeas courts in the past before the Act of 1867 was construed to permit retrial. In In re
Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894), the accused was convicted under a federal statute of cattle
rustling in the Chickasaw Nation, Indian Territory, and sentenced by the trial court to a
year in the state prison. The habeas court (in this case the Supreme Court) determined
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to place the prisoner in a state prison, and
therefore the writ ought to issue. But, as the Court noted, at 259:
Much complaint is made that persons are often discharged from arrest and im-
prisonment when their conviction . . . is perfectly correct, the excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the court being in enlarging the punishment or in enforcing it in a
different mode or place than that provided by the law.
The Court could find no precedent for remedy other than outright release, however,
save in a Pennsylvania decision based on writ of error rather than habeas corpus, id.,
at 259-60. Indeed, the Court noted at 255 that In re Mills, 135 US. 263 (1890) was directly
on point and contra. The Court declined to follow its own precedent however, and re-
manded the prisoner for resentencing, stating, at 259-60:
But in such cases ... where the conviction is correct and the error.., as stated,
there does not seem to be any good reason why jurisdiction of the prisoner should
not be reassumed by the trial court... in order that its defect may be corrected.
This decision also clearly suggests that retrial was not the usual practice in the past,
although it does not indicate whether this was a matter of practice or of law. On this
point, see also Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176, 182, 184 (1888); Ex Parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1873).
76. 597 U.S. 436 (1970).
77. Id., at 443.
78. See note 3 supra; United States v. Marakar, 300 F.2d 513 (3rd Cir. 19621; Adams v.
United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961). The test to be applied in determining whether
a subsequent prosecution is for the same "offense," and therefore barred by double jeopardy
is presently the subject of considerable debate. The traditional test has been the "same Cvi-
dence" test, by which a second prosecution was barred only if a conviction would require
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estoppel, on the other hand, may be raised as a defense where two
separate and distinct offenses are involved,79 and bars only the relitiga-
tion of specific issues.80 This may, of course, in some cases prevent
retrial as effectively as would double jeopardy.81
In order to bar the relitigation of an issue of fact or the legal conse-
quences of specific facts82 by collateral estoppel, the party asserting it as
finding the defendant guilty on the "same evidence" on which a prior jury acquitted hm.
The difficulties with this test are that it permits successive prosecutions for what 1t argu-
ably a single "act," e.g., the robbery of several individuals. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436 (1970). The opportunity for such multiple prosecutions has led to the proposal of
a "same transaction" test which would in effect require the state to join all its claims
against an individual for any one transaction in a single prosecution, and would bar any
subsequent prosecution based on a charge arising out of the earlier "transaction." See Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-60 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
This would make the double jeopardy prohibition more analogous to the res judicata
principle of bar and merger, which compels the parties to present all the issues arising
out of a single "cause of action" in a single suit. See note 3 supra. However, the use of
the "same transaction" test would also invite the difficulties encountered in determining
what constitutes a single cause of action in a civil suit. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCtIDE 59-
567 (1965); Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YA.LE L.J. 359 (1918); Schopflocher,
What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judhcata, 21
ORE. L. REv. 319 (1942).
The difficulties with the "same evidence" test are discussed in Note, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YAE L.J. 262 (1965) (noting four variants used in different states). On the problem
generally, see J. SIcLE, DOUBLE JEOPARDY Ch. 2, 3 & 5 (1969); Kirchheimer, The Act,
The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949); Mayers and Yarborough, his
Vexari, New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1960); Newman,
Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions: A Suggested Solution, 34
S. CAL. L. REV. 252 (1961).
79. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948). Yawn v. United States, 244 F.2d 235,
237 (5th Cir. 1957). United States v. Jones, 334 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1964) cert. denied 379
U.S. 993 (1965).
80. The difference between double jeopardy and collateral estoppel is illustrated by
United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3rd Cir. 1943). Defendant was tried and ac-
quitted of the offense of bank robbery, although several of his co-defendants were con-
victed of that offense at the same trial. Defendant was then brought to trial for
conspiring with the others to commit the robbery and convicted. At the trial on the con-
spiracy charge, the government introduced evidence of his presence and participation In
the robbery as part of its case for conspiracy. On appeal, the conviction was set aside and
the case remanded for a new trial. The Third Circuit held that while the separate trial
for conspiracy was not barred by double jeopardy since the offense was not tile same for
which defendant had been previously tried, the prior trial had fully determined the Issues
of defendant's presence at and participation in the actual robbery, and the government
was therefore collaterally estopped from presenting these issues at the separate trial for
conspiracy. Although the government was not precluded from successfully prosecuting
for conspiracy by the decision in DeAngelo (if other evidence of conspiracy was avail.
able), collateral estoppel may prevent successful prosecution for separate offenses where
the issue previously determined in defendant's favor is a necessary element of the
second offense. See, e.g., Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); United States v. Fusco, 427 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1970); State v. Cormier,
46 N.J. 494, 218 A.2d 138 (1966).
81. E.g., where the second prosecution is for the same offense as the first and the Issue
barred from the second prosecution is dispositive of guilt or innocence, as in Chambers v.
Cox, 400 U.S. 870 (1970). The significance of this point is discussed pp. 1253-54 infra. In
some cases, the effect of collateral estoppel may be broader than double jeopardy; see note
80 supra.
82. Collateral estoppel may apply to either an issue of fact or a determination of the
legal consequences of certain facts. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDuRE 575-584 (1965). The distinc-
tion is discussed further at p. 1244 and note 107 infra.
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a defense has traditionallyns been required to show that: the precise
issue in question was litigated by the present parties in a prior action;
the issue was determined by the prior tribunal; and the determination
of the issue was necessary to the disposition of the prior action. This
usage has long been approved by the Supreme Court in criminal de-
cisions84 prior to Ashe v. Swenson,85 and these were the criteria adopted
in Ashe.86 The Ashe Court also indicated that these were the only
criteria by which the applicability of the constitutional rule of collateral
estoppel was to be tested,87 and that they were to be applied "not...
with the hypertechnical approach of a 19th century pleading book, but
with realism and rationality."88 This caveat was directed particularly at
past use of the third criterion, 9 the necessity of an issue's determination,
8,. F. JAmEs, CrviL PaocEsuRE 576-584 (1965). On collateral estoppel generally, see Po-
lasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IoWA L. REV. 217 (1954). Scott,
Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1942); Note, Declopments in the
Law-Rtes Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv.. 818, 840-850 (1952).84. See, eg., Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Oppen-
heimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916) quoted with approval in Ashe v. Swenson, 597 U.S. 436, 443
(1970).
85. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
86. The first two criteria were explicitly articulated, note 77 supra, and the third
criterion was implicit in the Court's reasoning that since the issue in question 'was the
"single rationally conceivable issue in dispute," its determination was necessary to the
jury's verdict, 897 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
87. The common law rule of collateral estoppel is encrusted with a variety of additional
requirements, and exceptions to these requirements which are recognized in -ar)ing
degree by different states and have led to general confusion and disagreement regarding
the application of collateral estoppel in criminal cases. One example is the requirement
of mutuality of estoppel, a rule that neither party is bound unless both are bound.
See 1 FRreSrAN, JuDGAiEN~s § 428 (5th ed. 1925); F. JAMES, CQVIL PnoCraE, 585.603 (196).
This rule would require that a defendant in the Ashe situation, p. 1290 sipra, iould
be able to raise collateral estoppel as a defense only if the state could also raise it to bar
the defendant from disputing the issue of his identity where the prior trial had resulted
in a conviction. Cf. United States v. Bower, 95 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); People v.
lfojado, 22 Cal. App. 2d 323, 70 P.2d 1015 (1937). There is a similar rule at common law,
that nonparties to the prior litigation are not bound by collateral estoppel, subject to
exceptions for vouchees, bailor-bailees, successors in interest and privies. F. J ,srrs, CrL
Pnocrmou , 585-595 (1965).
The confusion and inconsistencies resulting from the incorporation of such require-
ments into the criminal law is shown by the decisions collected in Annot.. 9 A.L.R.
3d 203 (1966), and the current dissatisfaction with and discarding of such requirements
in civil litigation are discussed in F. JAtEs, Civi PRooEuRE 599-603 (1965) and Currie,
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits on the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L R . 281
(1957). Nevertheless, a recent Fifth Circuit decision has suggested the continued viability in
criminal law of one such requirement, mutality of estoppel. Willard v. United States, 422
F.2d 810 (1970). Since non-parties are generally not bound by prior litigation, JAEtrS, id.,
585-603, this requirement would be particularly destructive of collateral estoppel in the
habeas context. Technically, a prisoner's adversary on habeas is his custodian, usually the
prison warden. SoroL, supra note 13, § 7. On retrial, however, the prisoner faces the prose.
cuting attorney. In Ashe, however, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following
statement from United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1961): "It is too late
to suggest that festoppel, is not fully applicable... in a criminal case... because of a
lack of mutuality ...
88. 397 US. 436, at 444.
89. Id., at 444-45 n.9. The Court's language makes it clear, however, that the passage
quoted applies generally to the use of collateral estoppel.
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which has generally been subjected to a highly restrictive interpretation
that had frequently prevented the application of collateral estoppel-00
The rule of collateral estoppel, thus defined, is inapplicable to issues
decided by an appellate court. Collateral estoppel arises only with
respect to issues of fact or of the legal consequences of a given set of
facts9' but not as to pure issues of law.02 The issues submitted to an
appellate court are generally of the third category, issues of law (on
which its decision is binding on the lower court), to which collateral
estoppel does not apply.93
It is true that an appellate court may decide, as a matter of law, that
specific factual evidence in the record is or is not sufficient to constitute
a necessary element of the case, for example, the voluntariness of a
confession or guilty plea, whether defendant's flight constituted prob-
able cause, or if police conduct established the defense of entrapment94
Such decisions would seem to fall within the second category above, to
which collateral estoppel traditionally has been held to apply. It is at
least arguable, therefore, that relitigation of such issues should be pre-
cluded from a retrial of the defendant. However, the same rationale
which precludes the operation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the
appellate process is applicable in barring the use of collateral estoppel
90. For example, an acquittal on a charge of armed robbery may be based on the jury's
reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed, or that anything was robbed, or that
the defendant was involved at all. See State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 2,34, 241, 105 P.2d 63,
67 (1940). In such situations, courts have frequently refused to allow the defendant the
benefit of collateral estoppel in a later trial, asserting that it was impossible to determine
what issues the jury "necessarily" decided in the defendant's favor. See Lugar, Criminal
Law, Double Jeopardy & Res Judicata, 39 Iowa L. REv. 317, 333-344 (1954); Note, Twiec in
Jeopardy, 75 YA.x L.J. 262, 283-86 (1965). This difficulty could be diminished by the use
of special interrogatories to the jury which would require specification of findings, but It
is possible this "intrusion" into the jury's deliberations might distort the "dispensing"
or "nullifying" function of the jury, Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra. See also F. JAmes,
Civis. PROCEDURE § 7.15 (1965); round, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Misr%: L. Ray.
12, 18 (1910).
The rationale for resolving such doubts in favor of the state rather than the defendant
has never been articulated. One explanation would be that if the issue was resolved In
defendant's favor by a prior jury, it will presumably be similarly resolved by a subsequentjury, and there is therefore no prejudice to the defendant; on the other hand, If the
issue was not resolved in the defendant's favor by the prior jury; there is a clear preju.
dice to the state in treating the issue as if it had been so resolved.
91. See note 82 supra.
92. These distinctions may be illustrated as follows: whether or not an individual was
apprehended by the police while running away from a store which had been robbed is a
question of fact; whether or not the facts of his flight constitute "probable cause for a
search" is a question of the legal consequences of a given set of facts: and whether or
not "probable cause for a search" is a prerequisite to the admissibility of evidence seized
from any defendant is a question of law.
93. F. JAMES, CIVIL PRocEDuRE 583-84 (1965); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56
HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 10 (1942); Note, Development in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HAyRv. L,
Ray. 818, 84547 (1952). See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1948).
94. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (entrapment).
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as to this type of issue.95 The appellate court must make its decision
on the basis of the record only. That record may be deficient in that it
does not contain some of the available evidence on the issue in question,
because of error by the trial court, 60 or the conduct of counsel.0 7 Yet,
the appellate court cannot hear such additional evidence in order to
reach an informed decision. Thus, if collateral estoppel were applied
and the appellate decision barred effective retrial,08 the appellate court
would, on the basis of sheer speculation, be forced to choose between
two alternatives: leaving a defendant in jail and freeing him unequivo-
cally. The practice of remanding for retrial is an equitable compromise,
since it allows the defendant a fair trial but permits the state to convict
defendants who apparently are in fact guilty by introducing evidence
which the state did not introduce before. Thus, the final disposition of
the defendant's status is grounded on a full factual finding.
The habeas court, by contrast, has available to it all the evidence
before the trial court on the issue in question, and the additional evi-
dence, if any exists, which it was the purpose of the hearing to adduce.03
Clearly, the habeas court does not face the difficulty of making an in-
adequately informed decision,100 and the analogy of habeas corpus to
direct appeal,' 0' although accurate for purposes of double jeopardy, is
thus inapposite with respect to collateral estoppel.
It might nevertheless be argued that the differences between the trial
process and habeas corpus preclude the application of collateral estop-
pel in the latter context. The principal differences between the trial
and habeas processes are illustrated by Ashe v. Swenson:102 (1) in Ashe,
the estoppel arose from a determination made by a jury, whereas on
habeas the decision is made by the judge; (2) in Ashe, the estoppel arose
pursuant to a general verdict of guilt, whereas on habeas the issue is not
guilt or innocence but the legality of the custody.
However, it is dear from other decisions that the requirement of a
"valid and final judgment"'103 does not mean that a jury verdict is
95. See pp. 1288-39 supra.
96. See note 56 supra.
97. See note 57 supra.
98. I.e., by foreclosing an issue necessary to the state's case; see pp. 1235-36 and note 81
supra.
99. See p. 1232 supra.
100. See pp. 1238-9 supra.
101. See p. 1235 supra.
102. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
103. See note 77 supra. In other decisions the phrasing has varied. See, eg., Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 809, 333 (1915) (dictum): "a question of fact or law distinctly put in
issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot afterwards
be disputed...."
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necessary to recognition of an estoppel where the issue in question has
been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.0 4 Indeed, in
many cases, the issues cognizable on habeas are issues normally decided
by a judge rather than a jury, as a procedural necessity (e.g., the ad-
missibility of evidence), and in some instances (e.g., the voluntariness of
a confession) this may be a constitutional requirement. 105
It is also clear that a general verdict of guilt or innocence (as in
Ashe) is not a prerequisite for the application of collateral estoppel,
since traditionally the "judgment" which creates the estoppel may be
merely a finding of fact. For example, in United States v. Oppen.
heimer,10 6 which established the rule of collateral estoppel in federal
criminal law, it was held that a decision by a trial judge that an action
was, on the facts stated, barred by the statute of limitations precluded
the bringing of the same action on amended pleadings which avoided
the statute of limitations.1 7 Similarly, in Mulreed v. Kropp,"$ the
defendant pleaded guilty to unarmed robbery pursuant to an agree.
ment by the state prosecutor not to prosecute for armed robbery. The
conviction was later set aside and the defendant retried, but on the
charge of armed robbery. 10 9 Defendant sought federal habeas relief
contending that the first conviction depended upon an affirmative find-
ing that the defendant was not armed."10 Under state law, the trial court
which had accepted the plea of guilty to unarmed robbery was required
to determine the factual basis for the plea."' The issue, therefore, was
whether the doctrine of res judicata applied to findings made pursuant
to entering judgment on a guilty plea," 2 as clearly it would have ap-
Moreover, the decision of a habeas court is a final judgment on the issue of illegal
custody, and appealable as such-under FED. R. Civ. PaAC. 73. See Developments, supra
note 15, at 1192-96.
104. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Green v. United States, 426 F.2d 661
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (defendant was tried on separate counts of robbery and unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle. A mistrial was declared, and the judge directed a verdict of
acquittal on the second count. At retrial of the single robbery count, the court ruled that
the prosecution was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence relating to the theftof the automobile (which was used in the robbery) to show that defendant had stolenthe car in order to commit the robbery). It is also wel settled that a jury verdict is not
required in order for double jeopardy to apply. See, e.g., K~epner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 128 (1904); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); accord, Wemyss v,Hopkins [1875] L.R. I 0 Q.B. 378.
105. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
106. 242 U.S. 85 (1916).107. This is another illustration of applying collateral estoppel to a determination
of the legal consequences of a given set of facts. See note 82 supra.
108. 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970).
109. id., at 1096-9.
110. Id., at 1102.111. Id., at 1100-01.
112. Id., at 1100.
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plied to a jury verdict premised on identical findings.m The Sixth
Circuit held that it did,114 and that retrial on the armed robbery count
was therefore impermissible.11 The determination made by the trial
judge in Mulreed would appear to be indistinguishable from those
made by habeas judges, for the purposes of collateral estoppel. In both
situations, the issue is a narrow one of fact and the concomitant legal
consequences; and in both situations the determination is that of a
finding of fact made by the court rather than a jury verdict of acquit-
tal.186 It would be inconsistent to extend res judicata to the findings of
113. E.g., if the defendant had been tried for armed robbery, and the jury returned a
verdict of guilty of unarmed robbery. Cf. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
114. The recent Tenth Circuit decision in Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491 (1970) is
apparently contra. There, defendant was charged with first degree murder and pleaded
guilty to manslaughter. The conviction was set aside, and a retrial on the first degree
murder charge was upheld by the Tenth Circuit, which stated, at 493: "The double
jeopardy implications reverberating from a guilty plea and a jury verdict are not identi-
cal," and that a "guilty plea does not operate as an acquittal to all greater offenses."
115. Similarly, in State v. Heitter, 203 A.2d 69 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1964), the rule of col-
lateral estoppel was held to bar the relitigation by the state of defendant's drunken and
reckless driving in a manslaughter case, where those issues had previously been deter-
mined favorably to defendant on misdemeanor charges before a Justice of the Peace.
Although the point is not elaborated in the Mulreed opinion, the Court appears to
have rejected an interpretation of Tatco which would apply the Ball principle to col-
lateral estoppel. See MuIreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095, 1101 (6th Cir. 1970).
116. As noted earlier, it is frequently difficult, in dealing with general verdicts of
acquittal, to establish that the issue in question was "necessarily" determined bemuse ajury might have proceeded on several alternative theories of acquittal. See pp. 124344
sup ra. There would be no such difficulty with respect to habeas, since the issues presented
to the habeas court are specific claims of constitutional violations (see p. 1241 supra) and
since the habeas court makes specfic findings of fact and conclusions of la p rather than
general verdicts of guilt or innocence. See, e.g., SOKOL, supra note 13, at 83-85 and the
opinions cited in note 185 inar.
it is possible that the petition for relief will present several caims, each of which wouldalone ju tify relief, and the habeas court may rule favorably to t e petitioner on
more than one such claim. SOKOL, id. In such a situation, it may be questioned whether
a particular claim was "necessarily" determined. There is no reason, however, why allthe determinations made by the habeas court as to claims raised by the petitioner
should not be considered "necessary to the disposition of the petition." The function
of the "necessity" requirement in applying coliateral estoppel to issues cloaked by a
general verdict is to insure that the issues were in fact determined; if the issue 'was
not "necessary" to the verdict, it may not have been fully considered, or even considered
at all, by the trier of fact. See F. JArMS, CrvL PRocEDURE 582-83 (1965). The only issue
obviously determined by a general verdict is that of guilt or innocence. By contrast,
each determination by a habeas court is analogous to a verdict of "guilt or innocence"
as to the specific claim in question. There is, therefore, no danger of treating as de-termined a claim which was not considered.
The reevance of the necessity criterion would, therefore, be limited to questions
concerning determinations of the factual allegations made by the petitioner in support
of his claimed denial of a constitutional right. It is possible, for example, that a
habeas judge might on the evidence presented make findings of fact that several state
police officers broke into defendants apartment, seized defendant and forcbly removed
from him some obscene photographs (as in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 43 (1961) and Lank-
ford v. Gelston, y64 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966)), and proceeded to beat him severely about
the head and shoulders with their batons (Screws v. United States, 325 Us. 91
(1945) (handcuffed prisoner beaten to death)), and reach the conclusion that the
evidence was illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. The sate would be estopped
from relitigating the admissibility of the evidence, but could reitigate the facts of the
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a federal district judge in the Mulreed situation and not to do so when
the same judge sat on habeas.
III. The Consequences of Applying Collateral
Estoppel to Habeas Corpus Decisions
The preceding sections have shown that the analogy 17 between
habeas corpus and direct appeal does not support the current state
practice of relitigating issues decided by federal habeas courts. The
present section will show that this practice serves no legitimate state
interest, needlessly duplicates judicial effort, encourages the falsification
of evidence by the state, irrationally delays a final determination of
guilt or innocence, and frustrates the important policies underlying
both the federal habeas structure and the constitutional guarantee of
freedom from double jeopardy.
A. The Application of Collateral Estoppel to Habeas Corpus
Would Implement Fundamental Federal Policies
Two fundamental federal policies would be served by the application
of collateral estoppel to federal habeas corpus. The first is the "mani-
fest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty
shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal
judicial review."'18 The purpose of federal habeas corpus is to provide
beating if a subsequent action were brought against the state, e.g., in tort, or for In-
junctive relief, cf. Lankford v. Gelston, supra, since the beating took place subsequent
to the seizure and the question "beating vel non" was not necessary to the finding by the
habeas court on the question of admissibility. This is analogous to the problem of deciding
which issues were necessary to a general verdict and would therefore, on the infrequent
occasions in which the situation arose, present no greater obstacle to the use of
collateral estoppel than does a jury verdict.
A similar situation might arise where the parties proceed on stipulated facts, The rule
of collateral estoppel would be applicable to determinations made on habeas both where
an evidentiary hearing was held and where the parties declined such a hearing and
proceeded on a stipulation that the trial record was adequate, as in Chambers v. Cox,
400 U.S. 870 (1970). Under traditional res judicata doctrine, facts stipulated are not them.
selves put in issue and may therefore be controverted in later proceedings. However, the legal
consequences of those facts are in issue, and a determination of the consequences, C,g., the
admissibility of evidence, becomes res judicata. F. JAMES, supra note 83, at 578, 584. (This
point does not embody an addition to the Ashe criteria, see p. 1243 supra, but rather
a definition of those criteria, i.e., what constitutes an "issue in question'). Neither
party need rely solely on the trial record, however; see note 15 supra. Again, such
situations would appear to be rare.
117. See Section II-A supra.
118. Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391, 424 (1963); see also Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969) (reaffirming Townsend and applying it to federal prisoners), Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 500 (1952): "Prior state determination of a claim under the United
States Constitution cannot foreclose consideration of such a claim, else the state court
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every defendant an effective means of asserting his constitutional
rights." 9 There are several interrelated considerations informing this
policy which are frustrated when a binding effect is not given to the
judgment of a federal habeas court. The first consideration is that the
evaluation of constitutional claims may be more accurately performed
within the federal judiciary than at the state level. This view assumes
that while a federal judge may be no more competent than his state
counterpart, he is more insulated from local pressures and continuing
relationships.10 Moreover, the state judge may be inclined to give
greater weight in his decisions to the substantive goals of the state
criminal law and its undisrupted operation than to effectuating the
constitutional mandates issued by the Supreme Court.'-" A second
reason for federal habeas review is to provide greater equality of pro-
tection to those prisoners whose convictions may be as erroneous, but
not as constitutionally significant, as those reviewed on certiorari.L!"*
In many instances, if federal habeas were not available, state prisoners
would have no effective means at all of asserting their constitutional
rights.=
Yet, all of these policies are greatly undermined and the resources
committed to their implementation inefficiently used due to the
present practice of allowing the state to controvert the decisions of the
federal habeas court by the introduction of additional evidence on
would have the final say which the Congress, by the Act of 1867. provided it should
not have" (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). For a criticism of this view
of the 1867 Act, see Mayer, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as
Legal Historian, 33 U. Cm. L. Rrv. 31 (1965); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-
Habeas Corpus, 65 lMicH. L. Ray. 451 (1966).
119. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963), the Court stated: "If the States
withhold effective remedy, the federal courts have the power and duty to provide it."
120. See Bator supra note 4, at 510, 521; Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting
Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to
Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. Ray. 793, 802-03 (1965) ('Justice is likely to be
impeded by the provincialism of the local judge and jury, the tendency to favor one of
their own against an outsider, and the machinations of the local 'court-house gang' ").
121. See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 7; and see especially Amsterdam, supra note 120, at
800, where the author concludes "[tlhe processes of state criminal administration are
designed to ignore or destroy . . . federal guarantees of civil liberty . . . " See also
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) as an example of local pressure.
122. Bator, supra note 4, at 512-14.
123. See Bator supra note 4 at 521, referring to the "notorious inadequacies in the
states' criminal procedures." The need for federal remedies, if federal constitutional
rights are to be protected, is illustrated by the case of Case v. Nebrasika, 381 U.S. 336
(1965). There a state prisoner unsuccessfully sought state habeas relief on the ground he
was denied counsel. The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that the allegation, if
true, dearly established a violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights, but aflirmed
the denial of habeas on the ground that state habeas relief was not available if the
sentencing court had proper jurisdiction. Following the granting of certiorari, Nebraska
passed a statute providing for habeas hearings in such cases and the Supreme Court
remanded. On the increasing availability of state relief, see note 126 infra.
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retrial. It was clearly not the intent of either the Supreme Court1 24 or
Congress 125 to grant such an option to the states. Application of the
rule of collateral estoppel to habeas decisions would compel the states
to proceed in good faith and curb these abuses.120
The second federal goal which would be served by the application
of collateral estoppel to habeas proceedings is that of finality:
If tolerated, our federal system would afford fine opportunities
for needlessly multiplying litigation. . . . The doctrine of res
judicata... reflects the refusal of law to tolerate needless litigation.
Litigation is needless if, by fair process, a controversy has once
gone through the courts to conclusion.127
The above statement concerned civil litigation, but it is equally
applicable to the criminal process.128 The doctrines of res judicata and
double jeopardy both derive from a complex of values which society
124. One purpose of the Townsend hearings, see p. 1232 supra, is to insure that the
federal habeas courts, and not the state courts, have the "final say." See note 118 supra.
125. Congress codified the structure erected by the habeas decisions in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-2255 (1964).
126. As the discussion at pp. 1256-60 infra indicates, there is no apparent reason
why a state proceeding in good faith would not offer all its evidence on the issue before
the habeas court. Thus, there is little concern that the coercive effect of the rule of
collateral estoppel would pinch anyone undeservedly.
A significant concomitant of the federal habeas policy has been the Court's concern
with the effect of that policy on federal-state relations. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 319 (1963), and that policy is currently under severe criticism (see, e.g., Nrws-
,WEEK, Feb. 1, 1970, at 12; Friendly, supra note 4). The inability of the states to effectively
retry some successful habeas petitioners because of collateral estoppel may add to the
present stress. Nevertheless, this consideration would not seem to outweigh the necessity
for applying collateral estoppel to habeas corpus. Such criticism is not new. See, e.g.,
the concern over "the prostitution of the writ of habeas corpus, under which the decisions
of the state courts are subjected to the superintendence of the Federal judges," in Federal
Abuses of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 25 Amz. L. REv. 149, 153 (1891). And see also tile
comments of the Court in In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894); more recently, the attorneys.
general of 41 states sought to have the federal habeas statute declared unconstitutional
insofar as it applied to state prisoners. See United States ex. rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213
F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954); and the Judicial Conference of
the United States has proposed effective repeal of the statute (28 U.S.C. § 2254) in
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATEs 23 (1954). The
conference in later years modified its position; see 1959 ANNUAL REPORT 313; 196
ANNUAL REPORT 83-4, and with the states increasingly establishing adequate procedures
to safeguard rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, it should lessen with the
decreased need for federal habeas relief. Georgia, for example, has recently enacted
procedures which largely duplicate the federal habeas structure. Habeas Corpus Act of
1967, GA. CODE ANN. § 50-127 (Supp. 1970). See also Onto REv. CODE ANN., §§ 2953,
21-24 (1970 Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN., § 590.01 (1970 Supp.). In some states the change
has been affected by Court rule, see, e.g., Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26. The
possible ways by which a state trial judge may insure an adequate record so as to
preclude any need for relitigation on habeas are discussed in Meador, The Impact of
Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REv. 286, 293-300 (1966).
Indeed, applying the rule of collateral estoppel may add to the impetus to improve state
procedures as did the decisions which created the present habeas structure.
127. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192-3 (1947).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1916); Frank v. Mangum,
237 U.S. 309, 3334 (1915).
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places on finality in the legal process. Although the expression of these
finality values assumes different forms,'20 it is a commonplace that:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and inse-
curity....230
The present state practice of relitigating issues decided on habeas
permits just such "repeated attempts" and is particularly repugnant to
these basic values since it represents the suspension of finality at the
discretion of the prosecutor, 13' an abuse which has not been previously
tolerated. 32
The constitutional rule of collateral estoppel enunciated in Ashe was
dearly intended to protect the finality values inherent in the prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy.1m Ashe presented the situation of a
defendant, being forced to "run the gantlet a second time,"'34 when
the issue in question had previously been determined in his favor and
the Court held this impermissible.
Traditionally, of course, some limits have been placed on the pro-
tection afforded by the prohibition against double jeopardy. The Bal1135
and Tateo36 decisions are examples, and the prohibition has been held
inoperative in cases involving a disqualified juror,27 the death of the
129. See, e.g., J. STiGLxR, DouBr JEoPARDY, 156 (1969) C'avoidance of unnecessary
harassment, the avoidance of social stigma, the economy of time and money, and the
interest in psychological security'.
130. Green v. United States, 555 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
131. This discretion is exercised not only in the decision whether to reprosecute, but
also in the previous decision of whether to fully participate in the habeas hearing.
132. See p. 1252 infra.
133. The point that collateral estoppel protects the same values as the double
jeopardy prohibition was recognized prior to the Ashe decision, in United States v. Rach-
rail, 270 F. 869, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1921):
Upon a trial of the present indictment, the issue as to whether the return filed
was false and fraudulent, would be a fundamental proposition. That issue was in-
volved in the previous trial [where defendant was acquitted of conspiracy charges
involving the same substantive offense], and to permit it to be litigated again would
come so dose to an encroachment upon the constitutional rights of the defen-
dants as to warrant me to quash the present indictment.
The same point is -reflected in several state decisions, e.g., People v. Cunningham,
62 Misc. 2d 515, 308 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970) (noting that collateral
estoppel can play a critical role in protecting defendants from harassment when doublejeopardy is inapplicable).
134. Ashe v. Swenson, 897 U.S. 486, 446 (1970).
185. See p. 1286 supra
186. See p. 1285 supra.
137. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
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trial judge,138 or war. 89 There is one basis on which the courts have
consistently refused to limit that prohibition, however, and that is the
prosecutor's discretion:
To admit the exercise of discretion on such grounds would be
to throw open the door for the indulgence of caprice and par-
tiality.14 0
The reason is plain: it is the prosecutor against whom the double
jeopardy prohibition is intended to operate.'
It has been said that "the prosecutor has more control over life,
liberty, and reputation than any other person in America,"'m4 and the
danger of abuse of prosecutorial discretion is well-recognized. 43 To
give this official a discretionary power to suspend the double jeopardy
prohibition subverts the complex of finality values which underlie that
prohibition. Yet, it is precisely such discretion which the prosecutor
can presently exercise with respect to the issues decided by federal
habeas courts. Under present practice, the prosecutor can decide to
what extent he will participate in the habeas hearing, or perhaps
whether he will participate at all; 44 and he retains the option of whether
to treat the decision of the habeas court as final. This is only ostensible
justice.145
B. The Proposed Application of Collateral Estoppel Would Not
Prejudice Legitimate State Interests
Although the proposed application of collateral estoppel to habeas
decisions would serve important federal policies, a necessary considera-
tion is whether any state interest would be harmed.
138. Freeman v. United States, 237 F. 815 (2d Cir. 1916).
139. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
140. United States v. Watson, 28 F. Cas. 499, 500-01 (1868); see also Downum v.
United States, 332 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
141. "[D]ouble jeopardy is ... a principle employed by tie state to control one of Its
own officials in the interest of a greater community concern .... " J. STIcn, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, 155 (1969).
142. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Cimi. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940).
143. E.g., J. STIGLEa, DouBLE JEOPARDY 155-187 (1969); K. DAvis, DisCErEIoNARY JusTICE,
188-190, 224-25 (1969); Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CI, JL REV,
427, 428-30 (1960); H. PACER, THE LiMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 290.92 (1968);
THE PPSmsNT's COMMzISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE-
TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs, 5-9, 72-76 (1967).
144. Although there is no reported case on this point, there is apparently no present
bar to the prosecutor's "defaulting" at the habeas hearing and nevertheless relitigating
the very issues before the habeas court upon retrial of the defendant In a state court.
Presumably, the habeas judge would not stay the order of release in such a case, but
there is nothing to prevent the prosecutor from having the prisoner re-arrested upon his
release from custody.
145. See KAFKA, supra p. 1229.
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1. Possible Prejudice to the State from Petitioner's
Delay in Seeking Relief
One possible source of prejudice to the state is the fact that habeas
relief may be sought at any time during the petitioner's stay in cus-
tody. 46 Thus, if the prisoner should delay seeking relief, the practical
difficulties of reassembling the evidence may prevent the state from
attempting a retrial, or even effectively contesting the habeas petition.14 T
The difficulty seems more apparent than real, however, since presum-
ably prisoners will seek their release at the earliest opportunity.
Moreover, in those cases of delay calculated to disable the state from
either sustaining its case or showing the error to be harmless, the state
may invoke the doctrine of laches.U4s Laches has been successfully raised
by the state where, for example, the petitioner waited eighteen years
after his conviction before seeking habeas relief.'40
More to the point, however, is the fact that the difficulties which
arise from delay are at least equally attendant upon any subsequent
state relitigation of the habeas court's determination. Thus, in such
cases, the only effect of adopting the rule of collateral estoppel would
be to prevent the state from trying to prove on retrial that which, ex
hypothesi, it could not prove at the habeas hearing.15
2. Possible Prejudice to the State if Prevented from
Retrying Effectively Successful Habeas Petitioners
Although the foreclosure of issues by collateral estoppel will not
result'in every successful habeas petitioner being "granted immunity
from punishment," effective retrial will be precluded where the issue
determined unfavorably to the state is vital to its case.' 6 ' Thus, the
146. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 US. 234 (1963); SoKr, supra note 16, at 21-SO.
147. See generally Peyton v. Rowe, 391 US. 54, 62-53 (1958); Geagan v. Gavin, 181
F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Mass. 1960), af'd, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
903 (1962); and see Judge Friendly's comments, supra note 4, at 147 and Meador, supra note
4, at 287-88.
148. Laches is a doctrine, also known as the doctrine of stale demand, by which
equitable relief is denied to one who has been guilty of such delay, neglect or omission
in asserting a right as to unfairly prejudice an adverse party. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.
2d 1314 (1954). Although laches is an eqtutable doctrine, and habeas a legal remedy, SOnOL,
supra note 13, at 4, the Supreme Court has recently indicated that equitable principles
may govern habeas relieft "A suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may
disentitle him to the relief he seeks." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963).
149. Dean v. North Carolina, 269 F. Supp. 986, 992-93 (M.D.N.C. 1967); and see Bowen
v. United States, 192 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v. Wiggins, 184 F. Supp. 673
(D. Col. 1960).
150. These objections are properly addressed to the policy of empowering federal
habeas courts to reopen prior state adjudications, and have in fact been frequently so
used. See articles cited in note 4 supra.
151. See Chambers v. Cox, 400 U.S. 870 (1970). Clearly, the potential for effective im-
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states will find it necessary to release some portion of the prisoners who
would be retried and reconvicted under present practice.
However, any objection on this basis to the proposed application of
collateral estoppel to habeas corpus is misdirected, since collateral
estoppel is a procedural rule and does not embody any substantive
constitutional doctrine. The rule of collateral estoppel in and of itself
only bars the relitigation; it does not address the question of whether
an accused should be allowed to go free when the only evidence against
him was seized in violation of his constitutional rights. The answer to
this question flows from the decision that an accused may be convicted
only upon the evidence presented at his trial, and the decision that
evidence illegally obtained may not be so presented. 1 2 It is therefore
misleading to say with respect to those cases where the state is barred
from relitigating a critical issue that the prisoner is set free because of
the rule of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel does not alter the
accommodation of competing interests and policies reached in the
substantive criminal law but instead implements whatever accommo-
dation existS. 15 3
munity by habeas relief, but not by appellate relief, might lead to greater use of the habeas
process by prisoners. However, the increased burden on federal habeas courts, although
it would be offset with respect to the load on the federal judiciary as a whole by the
decreased work-load of federal appellate courts, might lead to a tendency in some federaljudges to "broaden" the concept of harmless error, particularly in those instances where
petitioner's guilt was patent. Cf. the views of Judge Friendly, note 4 supra. To the
extent that states begin to provide adequate procedures, see note 126 supra, and thus
lessen the number of hearings necessary, this difficulty would be avoided. In any event,
the federal judiciary remains a better prospect for the protection of constitutional rights
than present state procedures, as discussed p. 1249 supra.
152. This is also true where the issue as to which collateral estoppel operates is the
voluntariness of a confession. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), or racial dis.
crimination in jury selections, note 165 infra.
153. That is, the application of collateral estoppel would be equally consistent with
a criminal process considerably less favorable to the accused than presently exists, such
as the "Crime Control Model" of Professor Packer, in THE LirmNrs or 'ru. CRuMINAL
SsANc1oN 149-249 (1968), or with a requirement that the habeas petitioner present a
"colorable claim of innocence" as advocated by Judge Friendly supra note 3, and Justice
Black in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 235-36, 242 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
Collateral estoppel does not alter but merely implements whatever underlying values
inform the criminal process. Thus, recognition of collateral estoppel in the habeas
context is entirely consistent with United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (see note
50 supra). That decision cannot be read as repudiating the accommodation of interests
within the criminal process represented by the decisions with respect to search and seizure,
or confessions. On the contrary, the court recognized in Tateo that the existing accommoda-
tion would be distorted by forcing either an appellate court (which lacked the necessary
information) or a habeas court (which did not have cognizance of all the relevant issues)
to make a final choice between acquittal and conviction.
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3. Possible Prejudice to the State Arising from its Inability to Present
a Full Case and Seek Appellate Review
In a federal habeas proceeding, the state has the opportunity to
remedy any defects in its case on the issue before the court by presenting
additional evidence not contained in the trial record.'7* Indeed, the
state's task may be less formidable on habeas than at a criminal trial.
The level of proof required is a preponderance of the evidence, rather
than "beyond a reasonable doubt,""55 and the petitioner has the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that his rights were
violated.10 The state thus is afforded two opportunities (at the original
trial and at the habeas hearing) to meet the constitutional standard, and
no legitimate' 57 interest would be served by allowing it a third.as
The doctrine of "harmless error""15 9 further reduces any possible
prejudice to the state's interests, since even if the petitioner's claim of
constitutional error is sustained, the state may "save" the conviction by
showing that the error was harmless, and therefore does not affect the
legality of the custody.160 Finally, the habeas court's decision is subject
to appellate review. 6'
154. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963). ("The State must be given the
opportunity to present other testimonial and documentary evidence relevant to the dis-
puted issues.'). See also United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Follette, 358 F.2d 922 (2nd Cir.
1966) (error to order habeas petitioner's release without allowing state to offer evidence
relevant to issue of denial of counsel).
155. This would not be true, of course, where the lesser standard had been applied
at the original trial. Cf. notes 56-57 supra.
156. See p. 1240 supra.
157. Possible state abuse of the retrial process is discussed at pp. 125660 infra.
158. The rule would presumably bar any reopening of the issue by the state, whether
it had evidence available but not offered or later discovered new evidence. This rule
would merely produce the same result as would occur at trial if the evidence on the
issue were insufficient and an acquittal resulted. The prisoner, on the other hand, would
presumably be entitled to reopen an issue on the basis, e.g., of new evidence, as he now can
under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (see p. 1232 supra), and under 28 US.C.
§ 2244 (1964). As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in a recent unanimous opinion:
"The State's resources are sufficient to enable it to prepare and present its case thoroughly
[at the first trial]." State v. Cormier, 46 N.J. 494, 509, 218 A-2d 138, 146 (1966). Cf. Downum
v. United States, 372 US. 734 (1962).
159. The application of this doctrine as enunciated in Chapman v. Californa, 386 U.S.
18 (1967), and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) to habeas corpus is discussed
in Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HAR%. L. RE,. 814 (1970). The
doctrine of harmless error would presumably be of little use where the issue was
critical to the state's case, save in marginal situations. However, the state might not be
precluded from reprosecuting for a lesser offense, e.g., where a confession as to the
sale of narcotics was ruled inadmissible, but the narcotics themselves admissible so that
a charge of possession could be sustained. Further, the view that a "colorable claim of
innocence" ought to be a prerequisite to successful habeas attack, see note 71 supra, my
result in a widening of the scope of "harmless error" to the extent that the issue is
vital if there is much evidence of petitioner's guilt.
160. See, e.g., United States ex. tel. Chambers v. Maroney, 408 F.2d 1186, 1193-4 (3rd
Cir. 1969) (admission of revolver shells held harmless error).
161. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2255 (1964). See generally Blackmun, Allowance of in Forma
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4. Possible Prejudice to the State if Barred from Relitigating
Habeas Decisions
The dispositive issue with respect to state interests in the efficient
administration of criminal justice is whether there is any state interest
which requires not recognizing the finality of habeas decisions. If the
state has no such interest, applying collateral estoppel to habeas decisions
would clearly make more efficient use of judicial resources, since
whether or not the state chooses to retry the prisoner, there is no reason
to expend additional resources in relitigating the issue which was de.
cided by the habeas court.
Clearly, the state cannot retry an issue on the same evidence presented
to the habeas court and obtain an opposite result.162 The state's success-
ful relitigation of such an issue depends, therefore, upon the introduc-
tion of additional evidence on retrial. Such evidence must have been
available to the state at the time of the habeas hearing, but not offered
at that hearing, or have been discovered by the state between the time
of the hearing and the second trial. A third possibility is that the state
may fabricate evidence to cure the defects in its case.
Where the state is at the time of the habeas hearing in possession of
evidence not offered at the original trial, there are two rational motives
for not offering the evidence at the habeas hearing. The first is essen-
tially economic; the state may conclude that the costs10 of fully con-
testing every petition for habeas which reaches the hearing stage are
greater than the costs of retrying the substantially lesser 1 4 number of
cases in which the petitioner succeeds. This is particularly so in those
situations where the trial record offers at least a semblance of support
for the constitutionality of the state's conduct, and where the infirmity,
if shown, may be arguably harmless error.1 5 There are no objections to
the state exercising its discretion (i.e., to present less than its strongest
case), but there are convincing reasons for preventing the state from
later changing its mind and avoiding the consequences of its first choice
by relitigating the issue and introducing the previously withheld evi-
dence. First, this practice disregards completely the burden and expense
placed on the individual who succeeds on habeas and then must on
retrial meet not only the state's additional evidence on the specific
Pauperis Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343 (1967); Developments
supra note 20, at 1192-96.
162. See note 3 supra (statement by Brandeis, J.); cf. note 118 supra.
163. E.g., the physical preparation of the case; presentation of witnesses, especially
police officers who must be removed from duty; the prosecutor's time; possible travel
time and expense.
164. See note 22 supra.
165. See note 160 supra.
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issue decided on habeas, but must repeat the entire presentation of his
case on the original offense. When the state is a party-defendant in a
civil suit, it has no discretion to impose such a burden on a successful
plaintiff, and it would be anomalous to permit such discretion following
a habeas corpus action.1 6 Second, allowing the state to "change its
mind" and introduce additional evidence against petitioner at a later
state trial treats lightly the role of the federal judiciary because the
habeas hearing is viewed as a form of "post-trial preliminary hearing"
in which the state has a non-binding option of participating to an
extent determined by a consideration of state resources, rather than by
considerations of federal policy.167 Finally, the practice of permitting
the state to introduce at retrial evidence withheld at an earlier habeas
hearing only compounds the injustice already perpetrated on the
individual who obtains habeas relief since it is predicated on the
following elements: the state violated the constitutional rights of the
accused in the first instance;168 the state failed to provide an adequate
remedy for that violation; 6 9 the state chose not to make use of the
federal judicial resources available in such cases'70 and the state then
decided to subject the accused to the entire process all over again.' 7 '
The second reason why a state may choose to withhold evidence from
the habeas court is the belief that a more favorable ruling will be ob-
tained from a state court on subsequent retrial. Such a ruling might
result either through the state trial court's interpretation of the consti-
tutional provision in question,172 or the state court's giving greater
weight to the evidence in question. 73 The arguments against permit-
tig state relitigation of habeas decisions under this rationale are con-
clusive. The state's conduct in withholding evidence from the habeas
court in hopes of obtaining a more favorable outcome in a state forum
166. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87-8 (1916).
167. It is possible that some increase in the workload of the federal judcidary would
result from applying collateral estoppel to habeas proceedings, since states may be less
likely to rely on a stipulation that the trial record is accurate. However, there should be
a slight reduction in the state burden on retrial. Moreover, the federal burden was
dearly countenanced by the Court, and Congress, in providing for mandatory hearings.
Further, continuing improvement in state procedures may obviate the need for federal
habeas corpus; see notes 126, 151 supra.
168. Federal habeas jurisdiction extends only to alleged violation of constitutional
rights; see note 73 supra.
169. The federal habeas hearing is premised on the inadequacy of state proceedings;
see note 20 supra.
170. The state may offer evidence both on the issues in dispute, the harmless nature of
any error, and assert lathes; see notes 148, 149, 154, 155 supra.
171. Chambers v. Cox, 400 U.S. 870 (1970).
172. See p. 1249 supra.
173. See p. 1249 supra, p. 1259 infra.
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at best reflects an intent to harass the accused by forcing him to "run
the gantlet" again, 74 and at worst suggests a conspiracy to prevent the
accused from obtaining effective redress for the constitutional violations
which render his custody unlawful."7 In either case, such conduct is
objectionable for the same reasons adduced with respect to the prior
rationale,176 and there is here the added element of an impermissible
motive.
It is possible that the additional evidence offered by the state on
retrial was not previously withheld, but was discovered subsequent to
the habeas hearing. Although the state's motives may not be question-
able in such cases, there are nevertheless compelling reasons for not
permitting the relitigation of issues on this basis.
First is the policy underlying the prohibition against double
jeopardy; the very purpose of that prohibition is to insure the protec-
tion of the individual from the oppressive burden of successive trials.,
The principle applies with equal logic to both the reopening of the
case and to the reopening of any issue within that case. While the
constitutional safeguard may be displaced in a particular context by
other considerations,' 78 the mere fact that the state later finds evidence
which might have, or even clearly would have, resulted in a conviction
at the first trial has never been considered adequate justification for
permitting a second trialY79
Second, on a more practical level, the recognition of an exception to
the rule against relitigating issues on the basis of newly discovered evi-
dence would present an unacceptable risk of abuse. The lapse of time
between the original investigation (or trial) and the habeas hearing
may be considerable;180 conversely, the delay between the habeas hear-
ing and any retrial is normally slight, generally thirty to sixty days.18s
The state would therefore have only a relatively short time to discover
new evidence concerning a relatively old transaction. However, the
possibility that such evidence could be presented (if a distinction were
recognized between "newly discovered" and "withheld" evidence) might
create a tendency in prosecutors to withhold evidence, for the reasons
174. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 (1970).
175. See p. 1259 infra; cf. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
176. See p. 1257 supra.
177. See p. 1251 supra.
178. See pp. 1237-41 supra.
179. See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896); United States v. Sisson, 399
U.S. 267, 289 (1969); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
180. See p. 1253 supra.
181. SOKoL, supra note 13, at 84.
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discussed earlier, with the intention to use it later since it could not be
distinguished from "newly discovered" evidence.
As noted, a third possible explanation for evidence not offered on
habeas but available at retrial is that it was fabricated in the interim.
It is impossible to ascertain the incidence of such fabrication,8s2 since
it may vary in form from outright perjuryra to a more subtle "sugges-
tive reinforcement" of a witness' recollection. 8 4 Evidence relating to an
issue such as probable cause or the voluntariness of a confession is
particularly susceptible of fabrication and difficult to disprove.18 5 The
risk of such evidence being injected into the judicial process is dear.18 0
182. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) C'dcliberate deception of court
and jury by presentation of testimony known to be perjured'); Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor's knowing use of perjury); Curran v. Delavare, 259 F.2d 707
(3rd Cir. 1958) (defendants made several statements to police; police destroyed all but
one, and testified that it was the only statement which defendants had made); cf. Al-
corta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (intentional suppression of testimony by prosecutor);
see generally Annot., 2 L.Ed. 2d 1575 (1964); E. BonclAwm, CoN'vlcnNG 'ruM Isocexr(1932).
183. A striking illustration is provided by the case of Miller v. Pate, MS6 US. 1 (1967),
where a police chemist testified, with the prosecutor's knowledege, that the stains on a
pair of undershorts found in a barn near the scene of the crime and alleged to belong
to the defendant were of the same blood type as that of the rape victim. In fact, as a
later investigation showed, and as was admitted by the state on appeal, the stains were
red paint. The police were aware that the stains were paint, and had prepared a written
memorandum to that effect, of which the prosecutor was aware. Where the evidence
consists of testimony rather than physical objects, such fabrication may be difficult, if not
impossible, to detect.
184. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 897 U.S. 436, 439-40 (1970):
Six weeks later the petitioner was brought to trial again...... The witnesses were
for the most part the same, though this time their testimony was substantially
stronger on the issue of the petitioner's identity. For example, two witneses who at
the first trial had been wholly unable to identify the petitioner as one of the rob-
bers, now testified that his features, size, and mannerisms matched those of one of
their assailants. Another witness who before had identified the petitioner only by his
size and actions now also remembered him by the unusual sound of his voice ...
185. See, e.g., Chambers v. Cox, 400 U.S. 870 (1970). In this case, the testimony
on record at the first (state) trial was to the effect that "the police officers did not
know Chambers either by sight, name or reputation; that they did not have an) descrip-
tion of any person who might be bringing narcotics to the apartment; that no narcotics
had been found in the apartment prior to Chambers' entry; . . . and that no actions
occurred in the presence of the officers to indicate that Chambers had committed or
was in the process of committing any crime whatsoever... mhe residence did not be-
long to Chambers nor was he residing there temporarily." Chambers v. Cox, Civil Action
No. 5154, at 2-3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 1968) (memo. opinion).
On (state) retrial, the record contained testimony on the basis of which the evidence was
admitted, that "the [same] police officers had the word of two reliable informants that a
man known as Porky Pig. . . would deliver narcotics to the apartment ... [and] the man
who entered the ... apartment during the search had, on a prior date, been pointed out
to Detective Doe ... as being the man known as Porky Pig ... Detective Doe recognized
the man who came into the ... [a]partment as the man identified to him:' Chambers v.
Cox, Civil Action No. 5154, at 2-3 (E.D. Va. May 12, 1969) (memo. opinion).
186. See notes 182-83 supra. The harm resulting from the use of such evidence may
seem tempered by the appearance of guilt in fact, as in Chambers v. Cox, but the same
risk exists where the issue is one of police coercion, or racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion. The protection of collateral estoppel cannot be selectively applied on the basis of a
subjective evaluation of the petitioner's guilt.
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A federal habeas court is not necessarily in a better position to guard
against such fabrication than a state court, but it is at least arguable
that prohibiting the relitigation of issues decided on habeas would lead
to some reduction in the incidence of fabricated evidence. Under
current procedures, a prosecutor may await the results of the habeas
court to see just which issues, if any, need bolstering. If collateral
estoppel prevents such bolstering, a prosecutor will have to either offer
the fabricated evidence at the habeas hearing, or at the original state
trial. Offering such evidence at the habeas hearing may be less success-
ful (than at retrial) because the federal judiciary is to some extent less
susceptible to local pressures than are state trial judges'1 7 and because it
will be impossible to ascertain in advance what issues the state must
bolster. This relative insulation may make federal judges less likely to
be receptive to questionable evidence than state trial judges who may
be anxious not to appear to favor the defendant by making evidentiary
rulings which impair the state's case. 88
The other alternative open to the prosecutor is to offer the evidence
at the original trial. However, at this point, a prosecutor will not know
which issues (or even which defendants) will be questioned on habeas,
and therefore the prosecutor would have to "cover" all the possible
issues on which all the potential habeas petitioners might prevail. This
would require a substantial commitment to a policy of fabrication,
whereas the present procedure presents only an occasional temptation
to "save" a conviction by filling in a clearly defined gap. Thus, re-
structuring the process to force the prosecutor to offer such evidence
"in the dark" or before the habeas court may result in less of this kind
of evidence being received in the judicial process.180
In sum, none of the three possible explanations for the state's intro-
duction at retrial of evidence not offered in a prior habeas hearing
provide a sound basis for permitting the relitigation of issues decided
on habeas.190
187. See p. 1249 supra.
188. But see note 185 supra.
189. This is true unless it is also assumed that prosecutors as a class are Incredibly
energetic and wholly dishonest rather than reasonably competent but occasionally weak-
willed; in which case it makes little difference.
190. As the Supreme Court stated in Ashe:
No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a provable case on the first charge, and,
when he lost, he did what every good attorney would do-he refined his presentation
in light of the turn of events at the first trial. But this is precisely what the constitu-
tional guarantee (of freedom from double jeopardy] forbids.
397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970).
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